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JUSTIFYING PERCEPTIONS IN FIRST 
AND SECOND AMENDMENT DOCTRINE 
ERIC M. RUBEN∗ 
I 
INTRODUCTION 
Public perceptions motivate policymakers. They regulate to preserve certain 
perceptions, such as that of a fair judiciary, and to prevent others, such as public 
offense. They also respond when the public perceives a danger—for example, 
from gun violence. But what is the role of perceptions in defending regulations 
challenged as violating constitutional rights? Intuition may suggest that trying to 
shape perceptions should have a minimal role, if any at all, in the constitutional 
analysis. But existing doctrines paint a more nuanced picture, sometimes 
categorically rejecting and other times permitting shaping perceptions as a valid 
reason to regulate. 
Legal scholarship has explored the interplay between public perception and 
the law,1 but has not compared the ways First and Second Amendment doctrine 
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1. The literature is dense, and this footnote can only capture some notable exemplars. Amitai
Aviram has observed that laws can “manipulate” risk perceptions in ways that contribute to social 
welfare, though he takes no normative view on that phenomenon. Amitai Aviram, The Placebo Effect of 
Law: Law’s Role in Manipulating Perceptions, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 54 (2006). Adam M. Samaha 
offers an insightful theoretical framework for assessing “appearance justifications” for policies such as 
campaign finance limits and broken windows policing. See Adam M. Samaha, Regulation for the Sake of 
Appearance, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1563 (2012). Expressive theories of law focus on how the law expresses 
values and attitudes—which of course can influence public perceptions. They have been used to justify, 
among other things, doctrine implementing the Equal Protection Clause, which according to expressive 
theories precludes government policies “express[ing] a divisive conception of citizens—a conception that 
represents their racial, ethnic, religious, or other parochial identities as more important than their 
common identity as citizens of the United States.” Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard H. Pildes, Expressive 
Theories of Law: A General Restatement, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1503, 1533–34 (2000). But see Matthew D. 
Adler, Expressive Theories of Law: A Skeptical Overview, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1363 (2000) (critiquing 
expressive theories of law). This article discusses several specific areas where public perceptions animate 
policymaking. A notable area that is not covered in detail herein, but which has been addressed in other 
scholarship, is regulating the electoral system to avoid the perception of corruption. Nathaniel Persily, 
Kelli Lammie, and Stephen Ansolabehere have used empirical evidence to explore (and challenge) 
whether regulating the campaign finance system or requiring voter identification actually affect the 
public’s perception of corruption. Nathaniel Persily & Kelli Lammie, Perceptions of Corruption and 
Campaign Finance: When Public Opinion Determines Constitutional Law, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 119 (2004); 
Stephen Ansolabehere & Nathaniel Persily, Vote Fraud in the Eye of the Beholder: The Role of Public 
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treat perception-based justifications. This article begins to fill that gap. The 
comparison is increasingly relevant after the Supreme Court’s landmark Second 
Amendment decision in District of Columbia v. Heller2 because courts are 
looking to the First Amendment for guidance as they implement the right to keep 
and bear arms.3 Thus, it makes sense to consider the two Amendments in tandem 
even if, as this article concludes, the comparison highlights reasons to treat them 
differently. 
Categorical rules in First Amendment free speech doctrine block regulations 
intended to influence certain perceptions. To take one example, the government 
generally cannot regulate speech simply because it would be perceived as 
offensive.4 Yet regulating speech to influence other perceptions is not 
categorically barred. Preserving certain public perceptions, like that of judicial 
integrity, can justify speech regulations under heightened scrutiny without the 
need to prove actual harm—imminent or otherwise—to a fair justice system.5 
In the Second Amendment context, meanwhile, as doctrine has developed in 
the nine years since the Supreme Court articulated an individual right to keep 
and bear arms in Heller,6 some courts have accepted preserving perceived safety 
from armed violence as a legitimate reason to regulate. Most prominently, the 
Seventh Circuit upheld a ban on assault weapons and large capacity magazines 
in part because the ban “reduces the perceived risk from a mass shooting, and 
makes the public feel safer as a result.”7 The validity of that objective was 
questioned, including by Justices Clarence Thomas and Antonin Scalia, who 
dissented from the denial of certiorari in the case.8 What role, if any, the 
perception of safety should play in Second Amendment analysis is an open issue, 
ripe for scholarly attention. 
This article proceeds in three parts. Part II sets the stage by defining 
“perception,” and observing how in circumstances in which no constitutional 
 
Opinion in the Challenge to Voter Identification Requirements, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1737 (2008) (using 
survey evidence to suggest that voter identification requirements would not improve the perception of 
electoral integrity, in contrast to arguments made by litigants, and later the Supreme Court, in Crawford 
v. Marion Cty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181 (2008)).  
 2.  District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008).  
 3.  See id. at 595, 635; see also Heller v. District of Columbia (Heller II), 670 F.3d 1244, 1264 (D.C. 
Cir. 2011); Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 707–08 (7th Cir. 2011); United States v. Chester, 628 
F.3d 673, 682 (4th Cir. 2010); United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 89 n.4 (3d Cir. 2010); Parker v. 
District of Columbia, 478 F.3d 370, 398 (D.C. Cir. 2007). 
 4.  See, e.g., FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978).  
 5.  See, e.g., Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 135 S. Ct. 1656 (2015). 
 6.  554 U.S. 570. 
 7.  Friedman v. City of Highland Park, 784 F.3d 406, 412 (7th Cir. 2015) (Easterbrook, J.), cert. 
denied, 136 S. Ct. 447 (2015); see also Southerland v. Escapa, 176 F. Supp. 3d 786, 792 (C.D. Ill. 2016).  
 8.  Friedman v. City of Highland Park, 136 S. Ct. 447, 449 (2015) (Thomas, J., dissenting from denial 
of certiorari); see also Kolbe v. Hogan, 813 F.3d 160, 182–83 (4th Cir. 2016), reh’g en banc granted, 636 F. 
App’x 880 (4th Cir. 2016); Friedman, 784 F.3d at 420 (Manion, J., dissenting); NRA ILA, Gun Ban 
Upheld, Federal Appellate Court Uses “Feelings” To Justify It, DAILY CALLER (May 4, 2015, 4:52 PM), 
http://dailycaller.com/2015/05/04/gun-ban-upheld-federal-appellate-court-uses-feelings-to-justify-it/ [htt 
ps://perma.cc/38WN-DHYJ].  
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right is implicated deferential standards of review are generally indifferent to 
whether regulations are intended to shape perceptions. 
Part III turns to speech regulations, where limiting speech to shape 
perceptions has been declared categorically unconstitutional, but only in certain 
circumstances. Part III considers one theory of First Amendment doctrine—that 
its goal is to smoke out ideological censorship9—which may explain the seemingly 
inconsistent approach. 
Part IV shifts to consider firearm restrictions intended to preserve the 
perception of safety. Second Amendment doctrine has not settled the question 
of when, if ever, influencing perceptions can justify arms restrictions, and courts 
will look to the First Amendment for doctrinal guidance. First Amendment 
doctrine likely would reject preserving the perception of safety as a valid 
regulatory objective for a speech restriction. But historical weapons regulations 
and distinct Second Amendment values and risks suggest that perceived safety 
has a more legitimate regulatory role in the firearm context. Part IV concludes 
by discussing some pragmatic considerations, like avoiding baseless perceptions, 
which may limit when and how perceived safety can justify a gun safety 
regulation. 
II 
PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS AND NON-RIGHTS-INFRINGING REGULATION 
“Perception” is a broad term that calls for an operable definition. This part 
provides one before observing how in a wide array of government actions not 
triggering heightened judicial scrutiny, perceptions can and do animate 
regulation without presenting constitutional difficulties. 
A. Defining Perception 
“Perception” is used consistently in both legal and common parlance to mean 
“[a]n observation, awareness, or realization, usu[ally] based on physical sensation 
or experience; appreciation or cognition.”10 Perception is ubiquitous in human 
experience. When a person hears controversial speech, the person may perceive 
the speech to be offensive.11 When a person observes judicial candidates soliciting 
election contributions, the person may perceive corruption in the judiciary.12 
 
 9.  See, e.g., Elena Kagan, Private Speech, Public Purpose: The Role of Governmental Motive in First 
Amendment Doctrine, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 413 (1996). 
 10.  Perception, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004); see also Perception, OXFORD ENGLISH 
DICTIONARY, http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/140560 [https://perma.cc/SPQ8-PJAF] (last visited Aug. 
9, 2016) (defining “perception, n.” to mean “[t]he process of becoming aware or conscious of a thing or 
things in general; the state of being aware; consciousness; (spiritual) understanding”); Perception, 
RANDOM HOUSE WEBSTER’S COLLEGE DICTIONARY (1999) (defining “perception” as “the act or 
faculty of apprehending by means of the senses or the mind; cognition; awareness”). 
 11.  See infra notes 27–30 and accompanying text (discussing case law regarding restrictions on 
offensive speech). 
 12.  See infra notes 56–57 and accompanying text (discussing case law regarding restrictions on 
judicial speech). 
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When a person believes a stranger is carrying a firearm, the person may perceive 
danger.13 When a person considers a regulatory regime aimed at a risk, the person 
may perceive the community to be safer because of the regulation.14 
Perceptions have consequences, which is one reason why they factor into 
regulatory choices. The person perceiving a comment to be offensive may 
become upset or confront the speaker. The person perceiving judicial corruption 
may lose faith in our systems of government or not pursue a legal claim in court. 
The person perceiving danger because a stranger may be carrying a gun may 
leave the area or suppress valuable, but controversial speech that could provoke 
the stranger. The person perceiving a safer community because of a regulation 
may have more confidence that the government is doing its job and may feel 
greater liberty because of the regulation. 
Perceptions, moreover, frequently are based on “the actor’s knowledge of the 
actual circumstances”15 and are accurate proxies for reality. A judge accepting 
campaign contributions may, in fact, be more prone to partiality in a subsequent 
case. A perception can even be lifesaving. Psychologist Paul Slovic has observed 
that “[t]he ability to sense and avoid harmful environmental conditions is 
necessary for the survival of all living organisms.”16 The suspected gun carrier 
may be armed and dangerous, presenting an increased risk of serious harm. 
On the flip side, perceptions can be imperfect, misconstruing observations or 
exaggerating the extent of a risk.17 In part, this can reflect incomplete information 
and mental shortcuts derived from personal experience, education, and cultural 
norms.18 The judge soliciting donations may not become corrupt and the 
suspected gun carrier may not be ill-intentioned or irresponsible. 
The inconsistent correlation between perceptions and reality has led some 
commentators to prefer a more scientific approach to regulation than one 
responding to perceptions.19 But the Constitution does not always mandate that 
approach and perceptions often inform policymaking. 
 
 13.  See infra notes 162, 163, and 189 and accompanying text (discussing survey results about 
perceived safety and public carry). 
 14.  See infra note 23 and accompanying text (discussing example of regulatory regimes intended, at 
least in part, to make public feel safer).  
 15.  BLACK’S, supra note 10. 
 16.  PAUL SLOVIC, THE PERCEPTION OF RISK 220 (2000). 
 17.  See BLACK’S, supra note 10 (noting that perceptions can be based on an actor’s “erroneous but 
reasonable belief in the existence of nonexistent circumstances”). 
 18.  One mental shortcut that is frequently discussed in the literature on risk perceptions is the 
“availability heuristic”: “people think a risk is more serious if an example can be readily brought to 
mind.” Cass R. Sunstein, The Laws of Fear, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1119, 1124 (2002) (reviewing SLOVIC, 
supra note 16); see also id. at 1125–28 (discussing the availability heuristic as part of the review). This 
mental shortcut may explain why infrequent, highly salient events, like school shootings, play such a large 
role in public risk perceptions. For one discussion of how cultural norms may affect risk perceptions, see 
Dan M. Kahan & Donald Braman, More Statistics, Less Persuasion: A Cultural Theory of Gun-Risk 
Perceptions, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1291 (2003).  
 19.  See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 18. 
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B. Perception-Based Regulations Not In Tension With Constitutional Rights 
Responding to “common concerns and preserving the general tranquility” is 
a central goal of our system of democratic government,20 which necessarily 
requires government officials to be attentive to how the public perceives the 
world. Constitutional jurisprudence, thus, does not prevent most policies based 
on (or seeking to preserve or shape) perceptions. Absent circumstances that 
trigger “more searching judicial inquiry,”21 most laws aimed at that objective 
must only pass the rational basis test. So long as the government can show that 
legislation is rationally related to a legitimate government interest, the law 
surpasses the basic constitutional threshold. That, of course, is a low bar.22 
Frequently, there is nothing “illegitimate” or “irrational” about regulating to 
shape perceptions. Many examples exist of non-rights infringing policies 
intended, at least in part, to change or preserve public perceptions, and that 
objective does not undermine their constitutionality.23  
 
 20.  THE FEDERALIST NO. 16, at 116 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (“[I]f it be 
possible at any rate to construct a federal government capable of regulating the common concerns and 
preserving the general tranquillity, it must . . . be able to address itself immediately to the hopes and fears 
of individuals; and to attract to its support those passions which have the strongest influence upon the 
human heart.”).  
 21.  United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). According to Carolene 
Products, three categories of policies call for “more searching judicial inquiry”: those (1) “within a 
specific prohibition of the Constitution, such as those of the first ten amendments,” (2) that “restrict[] 
those political processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of undesirable 
legislation,” or (3) that are “directed at . . . discrete and insular minorities.” Id.  
 22.  The Supreme Court has described rational basis review as “a paradigm of judicial restraint . . . . 
[A] legislative choice is not subject to courtroom fact-finding and may be based on rational speculation 
unsupported by evidence or empirical data.” FCC v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 314–315 (1993). 
 23.  The regulation of hazardous waste through the Superfund statute provides one oft-cited 
example. See Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980 
(CERCLA), Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601–9675 (2012)). 
Extensive commentary addresses how the law and related regulations were in part a response to public 
perceptions. See, e.g., DIV. OF ENVTL. HEALTH ASSESSMENT, N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF HEALTH, LOVE 
CANAL FOLLOW-UP HEALTH STUDY 15 (2008) (“It was difficult to conclude from the results of these 
efforts, however, whether exposure to chemical wastes dumped at Love Canal was associated with any 
adverse health effects.”); LOIS MARIE GIBBS, LOVE CANAL: THE STORY CONTINUES . . . 51 (1998) 
(describing studies showing no health effects from hazardous waste in Love Canal, New York as “a bunch 
of baloney”); AARON WILDAVSKY, BUT IS IT TRUE? (1995); Gina Bari Kolata, Love Canal: False Alarm 
Caused by Botched Study, 208 SCIENCE 1239 (1980); see also EPA, UNFINISHED BUSINESS: A 
COMPARATIVE ASSESSMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS 96-97 (1987) (noting that the 
Environmental Protection Agency’s “priorities appear more closely aligned with public opinion than with 
estimated risks,” with the top public concern being chemical waste disposal). That fact, however, does 
not affect the policies’ constitutionality under deferential standards of review. For example, courts have 
rejected challenges to the retroactive imposition of costs and the classification of chemicals as 
“hazardous” under the Superfund regime in conclusory fashion, simply noting that such government 
action is not irrational, arbitrary, or capricious. See, e.g., Hüls Am. Inc. v. Browner, 83 F.3d 445, 453 (D.C. 
Cir. 1996) (holding that the Environmental Protection Agency must show only that there “might” be “a 
significant health hazard for the surrounding community . . . no matter how remote the possibility” in 
order to classify a substance as “extremely hazardous” in a way that is not “arbitrary and capricious”); 
United States v. Ne. Pharm. & Chem. Co., 810 F.2d 726, 733–34 (8th Cir. 1986) (quoting Pension Benefit 
Guar. Corp. v. R.A. Gray & Co., 467 U.S. 717, 729 (1984)) (rejecting a challenge to retroactive imposition 
of costs noting that “judgments about the wisdom of such legislation remain within the exclusive province 
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The role of public perceptions in animating or justifying a policy achieves 
more doctrinal significance, however, when the law or regulation is in tension 
with constitutional rights, such as the rights to free speech and to keep and bear 
arms. The following discussion considers those circumstances. 
III 
PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS AND FIRST AMENDMENT SPEECH DOCTRINE 
Intuitively and in practice, a law justified by its effect on public perceptions is 
scrutinized much more closely when a constitutional right is implicated. The 
judiciary plays a gatekeeping role in that situation through judge-made doctrines 
designed to weed out unconstitutional infringements.24 First Amendment free 
speech doctrine applies a “mix of balancing and categorical tests” to determine 
the scope of protected conduct and whether regulating protected conduct is 
constitutionally permitted.25 Significantly, categorical tests sometimes reject and 
other times permit shaping public perceptions as a legitimate rationale for 
regulating speech. Regulating speech to prevent offensiveness is generally off 
limits, but with longstanding exceptions, such as when the speech is classified as 
“fighting words” or the audience is captive. Shaping other perceptions, 
meanwhile, like those relating to the integrity of the judiciary or food safety, have 
not been categorically proscribed and have justified speech regulations under 
heightened scrutiny. This part explores a few ways First Amendment doctrine 
deals with perception-based justifications. 
A. Offensiveness, Integrity, And Dissonant Tests For Perceptions In Speech 
Cases 
Nowhere is First Amendment doctrine more categorically skeptical of 
restricting speech to influence public perceptions than when the perception at 
issue is offensiveness. In FCC v. Pacifica Foundation,26 the Court stated 
categorically that “the fact that society may find speech offensive is not a 
sufficient reason for suppressing it.”27 Pacifica considered a lawsuit against a 
 
of the legislative and executive branches”). 
 24.  See 2 BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 1031 (1971) 
(quoting James Madison, House of Representatives Debates (June 8, 1789)) (“If [rights] are incorporated 
into the constitution, independent tribunals of justice will consider themselves in a peculiar manner the 
guardians of those rights; they will be an impenetrable bulwark against every assumption of power in the 
legislative or executive [branch] . . . .”). 
 25.  Joseph Blocher, Categoricalism and Balancing in First and Second Amendment Analysis, 84 
N.Y.U.L. REV. 375, 379 (2009). Professor Joseph Blocher described: 
  Generally, balancing approaches set the individual’s interest in asserting a right against the 
government’s interest in regulating it, attach whatever weights are appropriate for the context, 
and determine which is weightier. In contrast, categoricalism prohibits this kind of weighing of 
interests in the individual case and asks only whether the case falls inside certain predetermined, 
outcome-determinative lines. 
Id. at 381. 
 26.  FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978). 
 27.  Id. at 745.  
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broadcaster for airing George Carlin’s “Filthy Words” monologue in violation of 
a restriction on “indecent” material.28 Although the Court upheld the regulation 
on narrow grounds,29 it declared a general rule that offensiveness is off limits as 
a regulatory justification. The Court explained its rule as reflecting the “central 
tenet of the First Amendment that the government must remain neutral in the 
marketplace of ideas.”30 
Other First Amendment cases similarly suggest that perceptions—especially 
those related to offensiveness—cannot justify a speech restriction. In Boos v. 
Barry,31 the Supreme Court viewed with extreme skepticism the proposition that 
the government had a constitutionally salient interest in “shield[ing] diplomats 
from speech that offends their dignity.”32 The Court struck down a law 
prohibiting signs within 500 feet of a foreign embassy that tended to bring a 
foreign government into “public disrepute,” refusing to make exceptions where 
a foreign diplomat, as opposed to any other person, was the target of insulting 
speech.33 Although couched in a strict scrutiny analysis, the Court relied on 
categorical reasoning about its “longstanding refusal to [punish speech] because 
the speech in question may have an adverse emotional impact on the audience” 
and the need to provide “adequate ‘breathing space’ to the freedoms protected 
by the First Amendment.”34 
Similarly, in Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement,35 the Court struck down 
a permitting scheme for demonstrations that granted discretion to a local official 
to adjust a fee depending on anticipated expenses for maintaining public order.36 
The Nationalist Movement desired to protest the federal holiday honoring 
Martin Luther King, Jr. and sued Forsyth County after being charged a $100 fee.37 
Ruling in favor of the Nationalist Movement, the Court noted that the mere fact 




 28.  Id. at 729–30. 
 29.  See infra note 48 and accompanying text. 
 30.  Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 745–46.  
 31.  Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312 (1988). 
 32.  Id. at 320. 
 33.  Id. at 322. 
 34.  Id. (quoting Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 55–56 (1988)). Falwell, and later 
Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443 (2011), shielded defendants from tort liability for intentional infliction of 
emotional distress. In both cases, it was alleged that the defendants’ non-violent but highly offensive 
expressive conduct caused emotional anguish, but the Court protected the conduct, holding that speech 
generally cannot be restricted solely because it is upsetting or even hurtful. See Snyder, 562 U.S. at 458; 
Falwell, 485 U.S. at 55–56 (quoting Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 745–46).  
 35.  Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123 (1992). 
 36.  Id. at 124–25.  
 37.  Id. at 127. 
 38.  Id. at 134–35; see also id. at 142 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (characterizing majority opinion as 
rejecting a “kind of ‘heckler’s veto’”).  
RUBEN_PROOF (DO NOT DELETE) 4/28/2017  12:14 PM 
156 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 80: 149 
Brandenburg v. Ohio39 has implications for the perception of safety and thus 
is important for comparing First and Second Amendment doctrine. In that case, 
the Supreme Court overturned the conviction of a leader in the Ku Klux Klan for 
advocating violence at a rally, holding that advocacy cannot be proscribed 
because it encourages violence “except where such advocacy is directed to 
inciting or producing imminent lawless activity and is likely to incite or produce 
such action.”40 Perceived risk of harm, in other words, would be insufficient. Any 
other standard “sweeps within its condemnation speech which our Constitution 
has immunized from governmental control.”41 
The cases discussed thus far exemplify situations in which First Amendment 
doctrine rejects perception-based justifications, but in other contexts, doctrine 
accepts influencing perceptions as a legitimate reason to regulate speech. 
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,42 for example, held that a State lawfully can 
punish offensive speech rising to the level of “‘fighting’ words,” or “those which 
by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the 
peace.”43 Such speech falls outside the protection of the First Amendment 
altogether.44 Other exceptions to the ordinary rule against prohibiting speech 
perceived as offensive include libels45 and obscenity46 which, along with fighting 
words, have long been subject to regulation.47 Pacifica established a further 
distinction, when “[p]atently offensive” speech is broadcast into the home so as 
to confront a listener without warning.48 
Although Pacifica involved offensive speech in “the privacy of the home,” a 
realm treated specially across doctrines,49 the Supreme Court has also allowed 
perceived offensiveness to factor into First Amendment analysis outside the 
home. In Hill v. Colorado,50 offensiveness gained constitutional salience in a 
sensitive context (protests and “sidewalk counseling” outside abortion clinics) 
where hearing the speech was unavoidable.51 At issue was a ban on protesters or 
“counselors” approaching within eight feet of another person near the entrance 
to a medical facility.52 The Court noted favorably the State’s interest in protecting 
 
 39.  Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam). 
 40.  Id. at 447. 
 41.  Id. at 448. 
 42.  Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942). 
 43.  Id., at 571–72.  
 44.  See Kagan, supra note 9, at 416. 
 45.  Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974). 
 46.  Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973). 
 47.  In Chaplinsky, the Court noted that these restrictions “have never been thought to raise any 
Constitutional problem.” Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572. 
 48.  FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748–49 (1978). 
 49.  See Darrell A.H. Miller, Guns as Smut: Defending the Home-Bound Second Amendment, 109 
COLUM. L. REV. 1278, 1304–10 (2009) (describing “the home’s constitutional preeminence”). 
 50.  Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703 (2000). 
 51.  Id. at 708. 
 52.  Id. at 707. Specifically, the ban applied within 100 feet of the entrance and was motivated by 
protesters at abortion clinics. Id.; see also id. at 715 (“[T]he legislative history makes it clear that [the 
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patients from “the potential physical and emotional harm suffered when an 
unwelcome individual delivers a message (whatever its context) by physically 
approaching an individual at close range.”53 The Court observed that “the 
protection afforded to offensive messages does not always embrace offensive 
speech that is so intrusive that the unwilling audience cannot avoid it.”54 
Pacifica and Hill represent exceptions to the categorical rule that applies 
when offensiveness is invoked to justify speech restrictions. Perceptions other 
than offensiveness, however, face no categorical restriction. In Williams-Yulee v. 
Florida Bar,55 the Supreme Court considered the government’s interest in 
preserving the “public perception of judicial integrity” in the context of a Florida 
bar association rule prohibiting judges from personally soliciting campaign 
funds.56 Even though “[t]he concept of public confidence in judicial integrity does 
not easily reduce to precise definition [or] lend itself to proof by documentary 
record,” the Court concluded that it was a “genuine and compelling” interest and 
rejected the challenge after applying heightened scrutiny.57 
United States v. Alvarez58 similarly considered the perception of integrity, this 
time of military awards. At issue was whether the Stolen Valor Act, which 
proscribed falsely claiming receipt of a military decoration, violated the First 
Amendment.59 The government defended the law as a means of preserving the 
“public’s general perception of military awards,”60 which a plurality deemed 
“beyond question” and “compelling.”61 The Court ultimately declared the 
content-based regulation unconstitutional, however, because the government 
failed to present evidence that the Act actually furthered its legitimate interest.62 
The opinion repeated many principles regarding protecting unpopular 
viewpoints,63 raising the specter that the Court suspected that the true purpose of 
 
law’s] enactment was primarily motivated by activities in the vicinity of abortion clinics.”). 
 53.  Id. at 718 n.25. 
 54.  Id. at 716. This exception to the normal rule also was applied in Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 
in which the Court accepted the government’s interest “to retain the character of the Sheep Meadow [in 
Central Park] and its more sedate activities” as “significant” and content-neutral, upholding regulations 
on sound amplification at a nearby bandshell. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791, 796 
(1989).  
 55.  Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 135 S. Ct. 1656 (2015). 
 56.  Id. at 1662, 1666. Chief Justice Roberts, writing for a four-judge plurality, applied strict scrutiny 
to the restriction. Id. at 1665 (plurality opinion). Justices Breyer and Ginsburg would have applied a less 
exacting scrutiny. Id. at 1673 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
 57.  Id. at 1667 (plurality opinion); see also id. at 1683 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“States have a 
compelling interest in seeking to ensure the appearance . . . of an impartial judiciary . . . .”); id. at 1685 
(Alito, J., dissenting) (“Florida has a compelling interest in making sure that . . . its citizens have no good 
reason to lack confidence that its courts are performing their proper role.”). Justice Scalia, joined by 
Justice Thomas, “accept[ed] for the sake of argument that States have a compelling interest in ensuring 
that its judges are seen to be impartial.” Id. at 1677 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 58.  United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537 (2012). 
 59.  Id. 
 60.  Id. at 2549 (plurality opinion). 
 61.  Id. 
 62.  Id. 
 63.  See, e.g., id. at 2543 (“[A]s a general matter, the First Amendment means that government has 
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the law was discrimination against an unpopular message such as one in 
opposition to the military, not preserving an important perception.64  
 In another context, cases applying the “secondary effects” doctrine, courts 
have treated as content-neutral and upheld speech regulations because of the 
noncommunicative impact of expressive conduct—like decreasing property 
value65—that seems to turn on public perceptions. The doctrine is most 
frequently associated with the adult entertainment industry, where the Supreme 
Court has recognized that “preserving the character of [a city’s] neighborhoods” 
can justify zoning ordinances barring adult-oriented businesses.66  
To take a final example with close parallels to secondary effects cases, in 
American Meat Institute v. U.S. Department of Agriculture,67 an en banc panel of 
the D.C. Circuit embraced preserving the perception of food safety, framed as 
“individual health concerns,” as a “substantial” interest justifying a law requiring 
meat distributors to provide country-of-origin labeling (COOL).68 Again, the 
perception-based interest was not barred by a categorical rule. Instead, the Court 
evaluated whether the government’s interest was “substantial” under the 
balancing test usually reserved for commercial speech restrictions.69 The Court 
held that several aspects of the government’s interest combined to make it 
“substantial.”70 One aspect was “the individual health concerns and market 
impacts that can arise in the event of a food-borne illness outbreak.”71 That 
interest turns primarily on public risk perceptions and their consequences.72 
Despite the fact that the United States Department of Agriculture expressly did 
not view COOL as providing safety benefits—imported foods and domestic foods 
alike must meet the same safety standards73—the Court nonetheless credited the 
 
no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content.”) 
(alteration in original) (quoting Ashcroft v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 535 U.S. 564, 573 (2002)). 
 64.  The Court has been protective of anti-military viewpoints in the past—speech banned by the 
Stolen Valor Act could have fallen into the same category. Cf. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) 
(flag burning); United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) (burning draft cards). 
 65.  See City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 48 (1986). 
 66.  See Young v. Am. Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 71 (1976). The secondary effects doctrine is 
highly controversial and the recent Supreme Court ruling in Reed v. Town of Gilbert has called its 
legitimacy into question. See Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218 (2015). Nonetheless, courts have 
continued to apply the doctrine, at least in the context of regulations on adult entertainment businesses. 
See, e.g., BBL Inc. v. City of Angola, 809 F.3d 317, 326 n.1 (7th Cir. 2015) (finding that Reed did not 
“upend[]” established doctrine for regulation of businesses offering sexually explicit entertainment). 
 67.  Am. Meat Inst. v. U.S. Dep’t. of Agric., 760 F.3d 18 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (en banc). 
 68.  Id. at 23.  
 69.  Id. (applying “substantiality” standard from Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. 
Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980)). 
 70.  Id. 
 71.  Id. 
 72.  See id. at 24 (noting that legislators thought consumers wanted to “choose American meat on 
the basis of a belief that it would in truth be better”). 
 73.  See, e.g., Mandatory Country of Origin Labeling, 74 Fed. Reg. 2658, 2679 (Jan. 15, 2009) (to be 
codified at 7 C.F.R. pt. 60) (“[T]he COOL program is neither a food safety or traceability program, but 
rather a consumer information program. Food products, both imported and domestic, must meet the 
food safety standards of the FDA and FSIS.”); see also Mandatory Country of Origin Labeling, 78 Fed. 
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“decision to empower consumers to take possible country-specific differences in 
safety practices into account” and upheld the law.74 
The treatment of perceptions by speech doctrine ranges from rejection to 
embracement, varying by context and the precise perception at issue. Categorical 
rules preclude regulating to shape some perceptions, but not others. The next 
subpart discusses one theory of First Amendment doctrine that may explain the 
discrepancies. 
B. Explaining The Varied Treatment Of Perceptions In First Amendment 
Cases 
How can the varying approaches to perception-based justifications in free 
speech cases be explained? The words of the First Amendment (“Congress shall 
make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech”75) do not provide any 
explanation of what the “freedom of speech” entails or a prescription for the tests 
and categories that judges invoke to implement it. It does not, for example, say 
that regulating to prevent offense is categorically off limits or that other “content-
based” restrictions are constitutional if they are “narrowly tailored” to advance 
a “compelling” government interest. Nor does it say that certain disfavored 
content-based categories of speech, like fighting words, are subject to less (or no) 
First Amendment protection.76 
Scholars and judges have spilled buckets of ink explaining the normative 
underpinnings of the “freedom of speech” and relating those underpinnings to 
judicial doctrine, resulting in various theories.77 This subpart considers 
perception-based justifications against the backdrop of one such theory, 
articulated most famously by then-professor Elena Kagan. Kagan theorized that 
speech doctrine is oriented toward smoking out government motives that run 
counter to a crucial First Amendment principle: it is impermissible to suppress 
speech based on animus toward a particular viewpoint or idea.78 This theory has 
appeal for many reasons, not least because, as Kagan has shown, it does a good 
 
Reg. 31,367, 31,372 (May 24, 2013) (stating “COOL is not food safety related”). 
 74.  Am. Meat Inst., 760 F.3d at 25. Later, after the United States government conceded to the World 
Trade Organization that “human health and safety are not part of the objectives pursued by the COOL 
measure,” the World Trade Organization authorized $1 billion in retaliatory tariffs. Panel Report, United 
States—Certain Country of Origin Labelling (COOL) Requirements, ¶ VII.581 WTO Doc. WT/DS384/R 
(adopted Nov. 18, 2011). Congress subsequently abandoned much of the COOL regime. See Associated 
Press, Meat Labeling Law Repeal Leaves Buyers in Dark About Product Origins, NBC NEWS (Jan. 4, 
2016, 10:04 AM), http://www.nbcnews.com/business/consumer/meat-labeling-law-repeal-leaves-buyers-
dark-about-product-origins-n489771 [https://perma.cc/8URG-JUR2]. 
 75.  U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 76.  See Kagan, supra note 9, at 472–73. 
 77.  See generally RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., IMPLEMENTING THE CONSTITUTION (2001) 
(describing some theories). 
 78.  Kagan, supra note 9; see also FALLON, supra note 77, at 94 (“[V]irtually all of the leading 
theories [for the free speech clause] would hold it impermissible, albeit for different reasons, for the 
government to attempt to stifle communication based on its hostility to particular ideas.”). 
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job explaining both doctrine and outcomes.79 Moreover, this analysis 
demonstrates an important point as we shift to the Second Amendment: Freedom 
of speech doctrine is understood as implementing speech-specific principles and 
thus may not translate to the very different context of the right to keep and bear 
arms. 
Understood through a motive-hunting lens, the varied treatment of 
perceptions in First Amendment cases can come into focus. Regulation to 
prevent offensiveness automatically raises a red flag since a person’s perception 
that speech is offensive treads perilously close to forbidden animus toward 
unpopular viewpoints. It thus calls for a categorical rule, and only narrowly drawn 
exceptions can pass muster. One such narrowly drawn exception that the 
judiciary has accepted is when an audience is relatively captive—exhibited in 
Pacifica and Hill. In that limited circumstance, the government is given the 
benefit of the doubt that it is acting to protect the interests of the captive listeners, 
not to censor unpopular viewpoints. Restricting advocacy of violence similarly 
raises a red flag. Incitement doctrine, which requires actual harm to be imminent 
(not just perceived), reflects another safeguard against “motives based on 
ideology.”80 
In contrast, other speech restrictions seeking to shape perceptions may pose 
less risk of belying ideological censorship and therefore do not require a 
categorical rule. In Williams-Yulee, preserving the perception of judicial integrity 
through a restriction on personal campaign solicitations by judges did not present 
a significant risk of viewpoint discrimination.81 The Supreme Court did not apply 
a categorical prohibition on that perception-based objective and the government 
was able to defend the law under means–end scrutiny without showing any actual 
connection between the campaign solicitations and corruption. 
Similarly, in American Meat Institute, preserving the perception of food safety 
and thereby preventing market disruptions by requiring the inclusion of factual 
information about country of origin did not, under a motive-hunting explanation, 
belie governmental animus toward any viewpoint. In light of experience with 
market consequences when perceptions of food safety drop, the asserted 
 
 79.  Kagan, supra note 9. Of course, no theory can synthesize all case law or capture all of the 
Amendment’s normative underpinnings. Another conception of First Amendment doctrine is speaker-
based, and “understands the primary value of the First Amendment to reside in its conferral of expressive 
opportunities on would-be communicators” to enhance “autonomy” and other desirable qualities. Id. at 
424. Another is audience-based and sees the primary value of the First Amendment to reside in enabling 
the public audience “to arrive at truth and make wise decisions, especially about matters of public 
import.” Id. Also, it is worth noting that Kagan is not the only scholar to suggest that motive hunting is 
the goal of First Amendment scrutiny. Professor Jed Rubenfeld, for example, has defended a principle 
for why First Amendment doctrine often is, and in his view should be, focused on rooting out illegitimate 
governmental purposes: because that is the best way “to honor a simple principle” underlying the First 
Amendment, that individuals have a “right to their opinion.” Jed Rubenfeld, The First Amendment’s 
Purpose, 53 STAN. L. REV. 767, 818 (2001). 
 80.  Kagan, supra note 9, at 433, 436–37. 
 81.  Cf. id. at 444 (“[T]he Court would treat differently a law prohibiting the use of billboards for all 
political advertisements and a law prohibiting the use of billboards for political advertisements 
supporting Democrats.”). 
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perception-based interest was accepted as a legitimate justification for country-
of-origin labeling.82 
In Alvarez, the Supreme Court struck down the Stolen Valor Act, though not 
by way of a categorical rule preventing the government from regulating to 
preserve “the public’s general perception of military awards.”83 Indeed, the Court 
deemed that interest “compelling.”84 But criminalizing false statements about 
receipt of military awards, the thrust of the law, was not “actually necessary” to 
achieve that interest—counter-speech, for example, could suffice.85 Under a 
motive-hunting explanation, the outcome in Alvarez suggests that strict scrutiny 
was sufficient to smoke out the government’s viewpoint-based motive, perhaps 
to suppress anti-military sentiment.86 
Theories of First Amendment doctrine—like the motive-based theory—rely 
on speech-centric underpinnings such as that the government “must remain 
neutral in the marketplace of ideas” to explain judicial doctrine.87 The next part 
considers whether the same doctrinal tests are necessary to implement the 
Second Amendment and its distinct values. 
IV 
PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS AND SECOND AMENDMENT DOCTRINE 
Before the Supreme Court recognized an individual Second Amendment 
right to keep and bear arms in District of Columbia v. Heller,88 regulating firearms 
to preserve the perception of safety would present few, if any, difficulties under 
the federal constitution. Similar to regulating other risks, like hazardous waste, 
that objective would raise more questions of policy than of federal constitutional 
law. But in Heller, the Supreme Court clarified that the judiciary must scrutinize 
gun regulations more closely than it would other risk-reducing measures. The 
Court established one categorical rule—the government cannot ban the 
possession of handguns in the home89—but largely left the creation of judicial 
doctrine on other issues to the lower courts. 
This part shows how evolving Second Amendment doctrine leaves the door 
open to regulating to preserve the perception of safety. Unlike the speech 
context, which likely would categorically reject that objective, historical arms 
restrictions and the distinct values and risks associated with the Second 
 
 82.  Cases involving the secondary effects doctrine can be similarly explained. Motive analysis, 
“although not answering all questions” about the doctrine, “provides the most coherent general account 
of prevailing doctrine.” Id. at 472. Secondary effects doctrine can be understood as “emerg[ing] from the 
view that it is relatively easy in cases involving secondary effects to isolate the role played by hostility, 
sympathy, or self-interest.” Id. at 490.  
 83.  United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2549 (2012). 
 84.  Id. 
 85.  Id. 
 86.  See supra note 64 and accompanying text. 
 87.  FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 745–46 (1978). 
 88.  District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008). 
 89.  Id. 
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Amendment do not require the same approach. Nevertheless, relying on 
perceived safety raises practical difficulties associated with a hard-to-prove and 
subjective interest that will limit its applicability in many circumstances. This part 
concludes by considering a few such difficulties. 
A. Second Amendment Doctrine After District of Columbia v. Heller 
Unlike First Amendment doctrine, Second Amendment doctrine has not 
benefited from decades of Supreme Court case law. Two years after Heller, in 
McDonald v. City of Chicago,90 the Supreme Court “incorporated” Heller’s 
holding to apply against state and local governments.91 Then, in 2016, the 
Supreme Court issued a two-page per curiam opinion rejecting the Massachusetts 
Supreme Court’s conclusion that stun guns are unprotected by the Second 
Amendment because they were not in common use in 1789, reasoning plainly 
rejected in Heller.92 Those three cases represent the entire universe of Supreme 
Court precedent since the Court articulated the individual right to keep and bear 
arms. 
Heller provided limited doctrinal cues to guide lower courts in subsequent 
cases involving regulations less stringent than handgun bans. At first glance, 
Justice Antonin Scalia’s majority opinion seems to call for an originalist analysis. 
The Court set out to reconstruct how the language of the Second Amendment 
would be understood by “ordinary citizens in the founding generation,”93 
purporting to reject an “interest-balancing” approach.94 Based on that 
reconstruction, the majority concluded that self-defense is the “core” and 
“central component” of the right, but the right is not unlimited.95 Among other 
things, “longstanding” firearm restrictions, like “prohibitions on the possession 
of firearms by felons and the mentally ill,” are “presumptively lawful.”96 The 
majority provided a non-exhaustive list of other presumptively lawful 
regulations, including “prohibitions on carrying concealed weapons,” “laws 
forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools and 
government buildings,” and “laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the 
commercial sale of arms.”97 The history-focused approach in Heller, including 




 90.  McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010). 
 91.  Id. at 791 (incorporating Heller). 
 92.  Caetano v. Massachusetts, 136 S. Ct. 1027 (2016). 
 93.  Heller, 554 U.S. at 576–77. Public meaning originalism posits a static interpretation of the 
constitution based on “the original meaning of the text, not what the original draftsmen intended.” 
ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 38 (Amy 
Guttman ed., 1997).  
 94.  Heller, 554 U.S. at 634–35. 
 95.  Id. at 599, 630 (emphasis omitted). 
 96.  Id. at 626–27 & n.26.  
 97.  Id. 
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repeated by the plurality in McDonald,98 and seemed to establish certain 
categorical exceptions to Second Amendment coverage. 
Yet, Heller also left the door open to interest balancing, such as intermediate 
or strict scrutiny, by concluding that the District of Columbia handgun ban would 
fail “any of the standards of scrutiny that we have applied to enumerated 
constitutional rights.”99 Similarly, in several places the Heller majority invoked 
the Supreme Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence,100 which contemplates 
both categorical rules and balancing tests.101 
In light of the dearth of precedent and the fact that Heller and subsequent 
Supreme Court cases have left “the Nation without clear standards” for 
implementing the Second Amendment right,102 lower courts have developed their 
own doctrine.103 After Heller, “historical meaning enjoys a privileged interpretive 
role” in the Second Amendment analysis,104 but originalism has not been the 
primary means of deciding cases. Rather, lower courts have coalesced around a 
two-step test that involves both historical analysis and interest balancing: 
First, we ask whether the challenged law imposes a burden on conduct falling within the 
scope of the Second Amendment’s guarantee. If it does not, our inquiry is complete. If 
it does, we evaluate the law under some form of means-end scrutiny. If the law passes 
muster under that standard, it is constitutional. If it fails, it is invalid.105 
Consistent with the high court’s statements about “presumptively lawful” 
regulations, at step one lower courts often find that “longstanding” regulations 
do not raise any Second Amendment problems.106 Otherwise, step two, “some 
 
 98.  McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 786 (2010).  
 99.  Heller, 554 U.S. at 628–29. 
 100.  See, e.g., id. at 635 (“Like the First, [the Second Amendment] is the very product of an interest-
balancing by the people—which Justice Breyer would now conduct for them anew.”); id. at 595 (“Of 
course the right was not unlimited, just as the First Amendment’s right of free speech was not. Thus, we 
do not read the Second Amendment to protect the right of citizens to carry arms for any sort of 
confrontation, just as we do not read the First Amendment to protect the right of citizens to speak for 
any purpose.”) (citing United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285 (2008)). 
 101.  See supra note 25 and accompanying text. 
 102.  Heller, 554 U.S. at 718 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also id. at 719 (“I find it difficult to understand 
the reasoning that seems to underlie certain conclusions that [the majority] reaches.”); Darrell A.H. 
Miller, Text, History, and Tradition: What the Seventh Amendment Can Teach Us About the Second, 122 
YALE L.J. 852, 858 (2013) (noting that the Heller majority “refuse[d] to explain how such a history-
centered test may operate in litigation”). 
 103.  But see Heller II, 670 F.3d 1244, 1271–74 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (“In my 
view, Heller and McDonald leave little doubt that courts are to assess gun bans and regulations based on 
text, history, and tradition, not by a balancing test such as strict or intermediate scrutiny.”). 
 104.  United States v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458, 470 (4th Cir. 2011). 
 105.  See United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 89 (3d Cir. 2010) (footnote omitted) (citation 
omitted). 
 106.  See, e.g., Heller II, 670 F.3d at 1253 (“[A] regulation that is ‘longstanding,’ which necessarily 
means it has long been accepted by the public, is not likely to burden a constitutional right; concomitantly 
the activities covered by a longstanding regulation are presumptively not protected from regulation by 
the Second Amendment.”); Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 91 (“[L]ongstanding limitations are exceptions to 
the right to bear arms.”); see also Blocher, supra note 25, at 413 (“Heller categorically excludes certain 
types of ‘people’ and ‘Arms’ from Second Amendment coverage, denying them any constitutional 
protection whatsoever.”).  
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form of means-end scrutiny,”107 tends to be outcome determinative. Typically, the 
scrutiny applied is “intermediate,” which requires that a policy be “substantially 
related” to the achievement of an “important governmental objective.”108 
Most important for the purposes of this article, the analysis as it stands now 
does not clearly preclude regulating to preserve the perception of safety. Indeed, 
the inquiry leaves the door open for the government to assert a range of 
regulatory interests to defend gun laws, one of which may be preserving 
perceived safety. The next subpart discusses when this interest would arise in 
practice, before exploring questions about its legitimacy. 
B. Regulatory Interests And The Second Amendment 
Under doctrine applied by the majority of lower courts, the government’s 
interest in firearm regulation is a factor to be considered as one component of 
means–end scrutiny. Justice Breyer, in his Heller dissent, predicted that “almost 
every gun-control regulation will seek to advance . . . a ‘primary concern of every 
government—a concern for the safety and indeed the lives of its citizens.’”109 That 
was the interest set forth by the government in Heller110 and, true to form, has 
been the interest relied upon in almost all Second Amendment cases thereafter.111 
 
 107.  Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 89. 
 108.  Intermediate Scrutiny, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 10; see, e.g., Kachalsky v. County 
of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81, 96 (2d Cir. 2012) (asking whether a “may issue” statute is “substantially 
related” to an “important” government interest). 
 109.  District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 689 (2008) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting United 
States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 755 (1987); see also Eugene Volokh, Implementing the Right to Keep and 
Bear Arms for Self-Defense: An Analytical Framework and a Research Agenda, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1443, 
1470 (2009) (“[V]irtually every gun control law is aimed at . . . preventing violent crime, injury, and 
death.”). 
 110.  See Heller, 554 U.S. at 689 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting that D.C. regulation on handguns at 
issue in Heller sought to advance “a concern for the safety and indeed the lives of [D.C.’s] citizens.”) 
(quoting Salerno, 481 U.S. at 755); Brief for Petitioners at 45–46, District of Columbia v. Heller 554 U.S. 
570 (2008) (No. 07-290).  
 111.  See, e.g., Drake v. Filko, 724 F.3d 426, 437 n.17 (3d Cir. 2013) (“New Jersey has asserted that the 
interests served by the Handgun Permit Law . . . include ‘combating handgun violence,’ ‘combating the 
dangers and risks associated with the misuse and accidental use of handguns,’ and ‘reduc[ing] the use of 
handguns in crimes.’”) (alteration in original) (quoting Brief for Appellees at 34, Drake v. Filko, 724 F.3d 
426 (3d Cir. 2013) (No. 12-1150)); Woollard v. Gallagher, 712 F.3d 865, 876 (4th Cir. 2013) (“The State 
[Maryland] explains that, by enacting the handgun permitting scheme . . . the General Assembly 
endeavored to serve Maryland’s concomitant interests in protecting public safety and preventing crime . 
. . .”); Kachalsky, 701 F.3d at 97 (“As the parties agree, New York has substantial, indeed compelling, 
governmental interests in public safety and crime prevention.”); Wrenn v. District of Columbia, 107 F. 
Supp. 3d 1, 10 (D.D.C. 2015) (“Defendants argue that the District of Columbia’s ‘good reason’/ ‘proper 
reason’ requirement reasonably furthers its important governmental interest in reducing the number of 
concealed weapons in public in order to reduce the risks to other members of the public and to reduce 
the disproportionate use of such weapons in the commission of violent crimes.”), vacated, 808 F.3d 81 
(D.C. Cir. 2015); Peruta v. County of San Diego, 758 F. Supp. 2d 1106, 1117 (S.D. Cal. 2010) (“[San 
Diego] has an important and substantial interest in public safety and in reducing the rate of gun use in 
crime.”), rev’d, 742 F.3d 1144 (9th Cir. 2014), rev’d en banc, 824 F.3d 919 (9th Cir. 2016); Defendants’ 
Opposition To Plaintiffs’ Application for a Preliminary and/or Permanent Injunction at 2, Grace v. 
District of Columbia, 187 F. Supp. 3d 124 (D.D.C. 2016) (No. 15-2234) (may issue law justified by interest 
in “prevent[ing] crime and promot[ing] public safety”). 
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Public safety, moreover, is indisputably legitimate, “important,” and 
“compelling.”112 For most gun regulations, unless they are categorically 
constitutional, such as “longstanding” restrictions,113 or categorically barred, like 
handgun bans,114 they are deemed constitutional under heightened scrutiny if 
they sufficiently further the government’s interest in preventing injuries, deaths, 
and crime. 
But the fit between the government’s interest in public safety on the one 
hand, and a given regulation on the other, is often in dispute. For example, one 
popular regulatory scheme limits concealed carry permits to applicants who can 
show some special need to carry a handgun in public.115 Most courts have upheld 
these so-called “good cause” policies either as regulating conduct falling outside 
the bounds of the Second Amendment,116 or under heightened scrutiny on the 
basis that they sufficiently further the usual state interest—enhancing public 
safety.117 But gun-rights litigants (and some judges) contest the empirical 
evidence showing that “good cause” regimes actually achieve that interest. A 
district judge in the District of Columbia concluded that the link was “not 
conclusive.”118 “[T]here is [no] relationship, let alone a tight fit,” he wrote, 
“between reducing the risk to other members of the public and/or violent crime 
and the District of Columbia’s ‘good reason’/‘proper reason’ requirement.”119 
That opinion was vacated and reflects a minority view that may not prevail on 
appeal,120 but it raises the question whether, in circumstances where experts 
dispute the safety benefits of a law or resource restraints hamper the 
government’s ability to conclusively establish those safety benefits,121 any other 
public interests can fill the gap. As a practical matter, it is under those 
circumstances that perceived safety would, and has, come up. 
  
 
 112.  See, e.g., Kachalsky, 701 F.3d at 97 (“As the parties agree, New York has substantial, indeed 
compelling, governmental interests in public safety and crime prevention.”). 
 113.  Heller, 554 U.S. at 626–27. 
 114.  Id. at 628–29. 
 115.  See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:58-4 (West 2017) (requiring applicant to demonstrate a 
“justifiable need to carry a handgun”); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 400.00 (McKinney 2017) (requiring applicant 
to demonstrate “proper cause,” interpreted to mean a “special need for self-protection,” Klenosky v. 
N.Y.C. Police Dep’t, 428 N.Y.S.2d 256, 257 (N.Y. App. Div. 1980)). 
 116.  See Peruta v. County of San Diego, 824 F.3d 919, 939 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc). 
 117.  See, e.g., Drake v. Filko, 724 F.3d 426, 437 n.17 (3d Cir. 2013); Woollard v. Gallagher, 712 F.3d 
865, 876 (4th Cir. 2013); Kachalsky, 701 F.3d at 97.  
 118.  Wrenn v. District of Columbia, 107 F. Supp. 3d 1, 10 n.11 (D.D.C. 2015), vacated, 808 F.3d 81 
(D.C. Cir. 2015). 
 119.  Id. at 11. 
 120.  Id. At the time of publication, cases challenging the constitutionality of the District of Columbia 
permitting scheme were still pending in the Court of Appeals. See Grace v. District of Columbia, No. 16-
7067 (D.C. Cir.); Wrenn v. District of Columbia, No. 16-7025 (D.C. Cir.).  
 121.  As a result of an appropriations rider, the federal government’s ability to study the effect of 
regulation on firearm deaths and injuries is greatly limited. See Christine Jamieson, Gun Violence 
Research: History of the Federal Funding Freeze, PSYCHOL. SCI. AGENDA (Feb. 2013), 
http://www.apa.org/science/about/psa/2013/02/gun-violence.aspx [https://perma.cc/6RAA-72AB]. 
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In Friedman v. Highland Park, the Seventh Circuit considered the 
constitutionality of a ban on assault weapons and large-capacity magazines, and 
the parties vigorously disputed whether the ban actually enhanced public 
safety.122 Writing for a two-judge majority, Judge Frank Easterbrook observed 
that “assault weapons with large-capacity magazines can fire more shots, faster” 
than other guns and then concluded that they “can be more dangerous in 
aggregate.”123 The Court also considered evidence showing that assault weapon 
bans “reduce the share of gun crimes involving assault weapons” and that a link 
exists between “the availability of assault weapons [and] gun-related 
homicides.”124  The majority discounted counterarguments that the large market 
for assault weapons outside the area of the ban (Highland Park, Illinois) undercut 
any safety benefit.125 Then the Court invoked the government’s interest in 
preserving perceived safety: 
If it has no other effect, [the] ordinance may increase the public’s sense of safety. Mass 
shootings are rare, but they are highly salient, and people tend to overestimate the 
likelihood of salient events. If a ban on semiautomatic guns and large-capacity 
magazines reduces the perceived risk from a mass shooting, and makes the public feel 
safer as a result, that’s a substantial benefit.126 
Friedman was criticized on a number of grounds, not least of which was the 
perception-of-safety holding.127 A dissenting judge opined that “perhaps” an 
interest in perceived safety would suffice, but there was “no evidentiary basis” 
for its connection to the regulation at issue.128 When the Supreme Court denied 
certiorari in the case, Justice Clarence Thomas, joined by Justice Scalia, dissented 
and made a similar point. “If a broad ban on firearms can be upheld based on 
conjecture that the public might feel safer (while being no safer at all), then the 
Second Amendment guarantees nothing.”129 Again, the critique was qualified by 
the fact that the Seventh Circuit relied on “conjecture” about whether the ban 
actually made people feel safer.130 
  
 
 122.  Friedman v. City of Highland Park, 784 F.3d 406, 412 (7th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 447 
(2015). 
 123.  Id. at 411. 
 124.  Id. 
 125.  Id. at 411–12. 
 126.  Id. at 412 (citing Eric J. Johnson et al., Framing, Probability Distortions, and Insurance 
Decisions, 7 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 35 (1993)); George F. Loewenstein et al., Risk as Feelings, 127 
PSYCHOL. BULL. 267, 275–76 (2001); see also Southerland v. Escapa, 176 F. Supp. 3d 786, 792 (C.D. Ill. 
2016) (citing Friedman for proposition that government’s interest in “alleviating the public of its fear of 
gun violence” is “substantial”). 
 127.  See sources cited supra note 8. The opinion was also criticized for departing from the two-step 
test for Second Amendment challenges. See, e.g., Kolbe v. Hogan, 813 F.3d 160, 182–83 (4th Cir. 2016), 
reh’g en banc granted, 636 F. App’x 880 (4th Cir. 2016), and on reh’g en banc, 849 F.3d 114 (4th Cir. 2017). 
However, the discussion of perceived safety in Friedman is similar to what one might expect as part of 
intermediate scrutiny at step two of the analysis. 
 128.  Friedman, 784 F.3d at 420 (Manion, J., dissenting). 
 129.  Friedman v. City of Highland Park, 136 S. Ct. 447, 449 (2015) (Thomas, J., dissenting from denial 
of certiorari). 
 130.  See id. 
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But a threshold question suggested by a Fourth Circuit judge in a subsequent 
case131 is whether preserving the perception of safety ever can justify a restriction 
on the right to keep and bear arms. As First Amendment doctrine shows in the 
context of speech restrictions, influencing some perceptions can be categorically 
rejected and others accepted as legitimate grounds to regulate. In other words, 
whether preserving perceived safety is valid in the Second Amendment context 
may not be as simple as asking whether the public’s interest in feeling safe from 
armed violence is “important” for the purposes of intermediate scrutiny.132 
Because courts deciding novel Second Amendment questions have looked to 
First Amendment doctrine for guidance,133 the next subpart revisits First 
Amendment doctrine and how it likely would treat the public interest of 
preserving the perception of safety. Then, it considers significant distinctions that 
counsel against simply importing the First Amendment rules. 
C. Should Preserving Perceived Safety Be Treated The Same In Second 
Amendment Doctrine As It Would Under First Amendment Doctrine? 
The Supreme Court has held that even speech advocating violence, which 
certainly could make people perceive themselves to be less safe, must be 
accompanied by imminent harm before it can be constitutionally regulated.134 It 
is not a long stretch from that established rule to the conclusion that speech 
generally cannot be restricted to preserve the perception of safety. 
One might argue, in light of many courts’ reliance on First Amendment 
doctrine to implement the Second Amendment right, that the same conclusion 
should apply automatically when guns are the regulatory target.135 Yet 
longstanding regulations contemplate the legitimacy of arms restrictions based 
on the perception of safety in ways that the First Amendment does not, and 
Second Amendment values (to the extent they are clear from Heller and 
McDonald) and risks differ from First Amendment values and risks in ways that 
implicate the perception of safety. Indeed, the rights are not just different, but 
can be in tension. These considerations counsel against rote importation of First 
Amendment rules in this context and suggest that preserving the perception of 
safety may have a more legitimate place in the Second Amendment analysis. 
1. Longstanding Arms Restrictions Relating to Perceived Safety 
Heller emphasized the importance of “longstanding” regulatory measures, 
which are presumptively valid.136 Historical analysis also may be instructive about 
 
 131.  See Kolbe, 813 F.3d at 182–83. 
 132.  None of the judges considering the issue in Friedman disputed the importance of feeling safe 
from armed violence. As discussed in the next part, feeling safe from armed violence has long justified 
arms restrictions and can be central to enjoying other liberties, like the freedom of speech. 
 133.  See cases cited supra note 3. 
 134.  Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam). 
 135.  See, e.g., David B. Kopel, The First Amendment Guide to the Second Amendment, 81 TENN. L. 
REV. 417, 461–64 (2014). 
 136. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626–27 & n.26 (2008). 
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whether the government’s interest in preserving perceived safety should be 
permitted to justify firearm regulations.137 In particular, a categorical rule against 
regulating to protect the sense of safety would run up against historical 
restrictions, unique to the weapons context, intended to do just that. 
From medieval England to early America the law governing the carrying of 
weapons in public was especially attuned to perceived safety. The English Statute 
of Northampton, passed in 1328 to restrict carrying weapons in public, was 
intended (at least in part) to prevent fear of violence.138 In 1405, Henry IV 
instructed that public carry can be prohibited “whereby . . . any of the people 
[are] disturbed or put in fear.”139 More than 170 years later, in 1579, Elizabeth I 
issued a proclamation urging enforcement of the public carry restriction because 
“her Majesties good qu[i]et people, desirous to live in peaceable manner, are in 
feare and danger of their lives.”140 In 1716, William Hawkins wrote that “where a 
Man arms him[s]elf with dangerous and unu[s]ual Weapons, in [s]uch a Manner 
as will naturally cau[s]e a Terror to the People,” he commits “an Offence at the 
Common Law” and violates “many Statutes.”141 In 1769, William Blackstone 
wrote that “riding or going armed, with dangerous or unusual weapons, is a crime 
against the public peace, by terrifying the good people of the land.”142 
American colonies and states similarly justified carry restrictions as a means 
to prevent fear of armed violence. New Jersey and Massachusetts provide two 
examples. In 1686, New Jersey enacted An Act Against Wearing Swords, &c., 
which prohibited “wearing Swords, Daggers, Pistols, Dirks, Stilladoes, Skeines, 
or any other unusual and unlawful Weapons” because, among other things, 




    137.  See Sandra Day O’Connor, Testing Government Action: The Promise of Federalism, in PUBLIC 
VALUES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 35, 36 (Stephen E. Gottlieb ed., 1993) (“History can illuminate the 
nature and strength of a state interest and also may suggest the degree of ‘fit’ between a challenged 
regulation and its objective.”). 
 138.  Riding or Going Armed in Affray of the Peace Act 1328, 2 Edw. 3, c. 3 (Eng.), reprinted in 1 
THE STATUTES OF THE REALM 258 (mandating that individuals “bring no force in affray of the peace, 
nor to go nor ride armed by night nor by day, in [f]airs, [m]arkets, nor in the presence of the [j]ustices or 
other [m]inisters, nor in no part elsewhere, upon pain to forfeit their [a]rmour to the King, and their 
[b]odies to prison at the King’s pleasure”). 
 139.  2 CALENDAR OF CLOSE ROLLS, HENRY IV, 1402–1405 526 (A.E. Stamp ed., 1929) (issuing the 
proclamation on July 16, 1405, in Westminster); see also ABRAHAM FRAUNCE, THE LAWIERS LOGIKE 
EXEMPLIFYING THE PRAECEPTS OF LOGIKE BY THE PRACTISE OF THE COMMON LAWE 56 (1588) 
(citing to 2 Edw. 3, c. 3 (Eng.)) (noting that carrying weapons “not usually worne and borne . . . will strike 
a feare into others that be not armed”). 
 140.  BY THE QUENNE ELIZABETH I: A PROCLAMATION AGAINST COMMON USE OF DAGGES, 
HANDGUNNES, HARQUEBUZES, CALLIUERS, AND COTES OF DEFENCE 1 (1579). 
 141.  1 WILLIAM HAWKINS, A TREATISE OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 135 (1716).  
 142.  See 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *148–49 (emphasis added). 
 143.  THE GRANTS, CONCESSIONS, AND ORIGINAL CONSTITUTIONS OF THE PROVINCE OF NEW-
JERSEY 289 (Aaron Leaming & Jacob Spicer eds., 1758). 
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justices of the peace the authority to arrest “such as shall ride or go armed 
offensively, to the fear or terror of the good citizens.”144  
Under the longstanding-restriction test, similar public-carry regulations—and 
their baked-in fear-prevention rationale—may fall outside the protection of the 
Second Amendment altogether.145 But they also are significant in that they show 
a tradition of regulating to preserve a community’s perception of safety from 
armed violence that is in opposition to a categorical rule barring restrictions 
aimed at that same objective. 
2. Second Amendment Values 
First Amendment doctrine is understood to implement distinctive, speech-
specific principles such as that the government “must remain neutral in the 
marketplace of ideas.”146 Those principles, which can explain the treatment of 
perceptions in free speech cases, do not underlie the right to keep and bear arms 
and there is no reason to assume that the First Amendment’s rules are needed to 
protect Second Amendment principles. 
Like with the First Amendment, the words in the Second Amendment are of 
limited utility for identifying underlying values, especially after Heller instructed 
that the first half of the Amendment (“A well regulated Militia being necessary 
for the security of a free State”)147 does not establish a militia-centric 
underpinning for the right. We must look elsewhere, and another obvious place 
is Heller itself, which held that the “inherent right of self-defense” is “central to 
the Second Amendment right.”148 
Self-defense has to be an important consideration after Heller, but its 
helpfulness in deciding the boundaries of the Second Amendment is limited for 
at least two reasons. First, the government has long played a significant role in 
regulating both weapons and self-defense—including to preserve the perception 
of safety149—the extent of which reflects an important difference between the 
First and Second Amendment rights. The First Amendment assumes that the 
state should not play a role in determining the content of speech. The Second 
Amendment does not embody as robust an assumption with respect to weapons 
and self-defense. Indeed, even while private firearm possession is protected, the 
state continues to play a large role in setting the boundaries of what “arms” are 
 
 144.  1795 Mass. Acts 436. For a contemporary analysis of the statute, see 1 WILLIAM CHARLES 
WHITE, A COMPENDIUM AND DIGEST OF THE LAWS OF MASSACHUSETTS 116 (1809). Professor Saul 
Cornell provides other examples in his contribution to this symposium. See Saul Cornell, The Right to 
Keep and Carry Arms in Anglo-American Law: Preserving Liberty and Keeping the Peace, 80 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 2, 2017. 
 145.  See sources cited supra note 106. 
 146.  FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 745–46 (1978). 
 147.  U.S. CONST. amend. II.  
 148.  District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 628 (2008). In other places in the opinion, the Court 
declared “self-defense” to be the “core” and “central component” of the right. Id. at 599, 630 (emphasis 
omitted); see also McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 US 742, 767 (2010). 
 149.  See supra Part IV.C.1. 
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permissible150 and what counts as lawful self-defense.151 And as Professor 
Lawrence Rosenthal has discussed, the government’s regulatory authority over 
the right to keep and bear arms appears on the face of the Second Amendment, 
in its reference to a “well regulated Militia.”152 Of course, some extreme 
regulations are categorically off limits under the Second Amendment,153 but 
deciding other categorical rules based on the self-defense holding in Heller—such 
as whether the government can regulate to preserve the perception of safety—is 
made more difficult by the historically accepted regulatory authority that was 
undisturbed by enumerating the right in the Second Amendment. 
Second, as Professors Joseph Blocher and Darrell A.H. Miller have recently 
shown, Heller’s emphasis on “self-defense” is indeterminate, failing to resolve the 
question of what precise values underlie the Second Amendment right.154 Blocher 
and Miller identify three possible values: autonomy, democracy, and personal 
safety. The autonomy view “is primarily concerned with the liberty of self-
reliance.”155 The democracy view posits that gun rights are primarily to prevent 
government tyranny.156 The personal safety view is closest to the “marketplace of 
ideas” logic that animates First Amendment doctrine. It suggests that the “right 
to threaten violence through the keeping and bearing of arms . . . contributes to 
personal safety in roughly the same way that speech contributes to truth.”157 This 
perspective is epitomized by the slogan that “[t]he only thing that stops a bad guy 
with a gun is a good guy with a gun.”158 
Indeed, of these three views, the marketplace perspective would be most 
opposed to a government objective of preserving perceived safety. The 
“marketplace of violence,” to provide an effective deterrent, would require that 
individuals perceive the threat of armed violence. Governmental meddling to 
shape perceptions about that threat would be off limits, just as ideological 
censorship is when it comes to the marketplace of ideas. 
Yet, all three views of the Second Amendment, in their strongest forms, 
conflict not only with regulations to preserve perceived safety, but also those 
 
 150.  Heller held that the Second Amendment protects arms in common use “for lawful purposes.” 
554 U.S. at 624. Even this broad articulation permits significant governmental involvement—both to 
regulate arms not “in common use” (thereby preventing them from becoming “common”) and to 
establish what “purposes” are “lawful.” 
 151.  As Professor Miller shows in this symposium, the boundaries of self-defense have always been 
drawn by the state. See generally Darrell A. H. Miller, Self-Defense, Defense of Others, and The State, 80 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no.2, 2017.  
 152.  Lawrence Rosenthal, The Limits of Second Amendment Originalism and the Constitutional Case 
for Gun Control, 92 WASH. U.L. REV. 1187, 1230–40 (2015). 
 153.  Heller established one such regulation: bans on handguns. 554 U.S. at 570. 
 154.  Joseph Blocher & Darrell A.H. Miller, What is Gun Control? Direct Burdens, Incidental 
Burdens, and the Boundaries of the Second Amendment, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 295, 347–54 (2016). 
 155.  Id. at 348. 
 156.  Id. at 350. 
 157.  Id. at 352. 
 158.  Id. at 353 (alteration in original) (quoting Eric Lichtblau & Motoko Rich, N.R.A. Envisions ‘a 
Good Guy With a Gun’ in Every School, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 21, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2012/12/22/us/nra-calls-for-armed-guards-at-schools.html [https://perma.cc/ZF3X-4KRK]). 
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directly seeking to reduce actual violence, which of course is a widely accepted 
rationale for arms restrictions. In other words, they each could present an 
obstacle to the sorts of safety regulations long accepted as valid by the courts, 
complicating any effort to use the self-defense rationale in Heller to derive a 
categorical rule about regulations seeking to preserve the perception of safety. A 
court would understandably hesitate before accepting, without additional 
theorizing, a presumptive link between a regulation intended to preserve 
perceived safety and the violation of some self-defense-related principle.159 
3. Second Amendment Risks 
The principles underlying the First and Second Amendments are different 
and thus call for different doctrinal rules. The risks associated with the two rights 
are also distinct; indeed, gun carrying and use can undermine perceived safety 
and chill other liberties in ways speech does not. These risks underscore both why 
firearms can have such an intense impact on perceived safety and why a 
categorical rule against regulation to preserve perceived safety is less appropriate 
in the Second Amendment context than speech context. Relatedly, they highlight 
why a court could find this interest substantial enough to justify a weapon 
restriction under heightened scrutiny. 
One need not look far to find examples in which people carrying firearms 
cause others to feel unsafe and chill discourse, thereby erecting barriers in the 
marketplace of ideas.160 In fact, this is one of the primary reasons many people 
oppose allowing concealed carry on college campuses. According to four national 
organizations of teachers, professors, colleges, and universities, “[s]tudents and 
faculty members will not be comfortable discussing controversial subjects if they 
think there might be a gun in the room.”161 A recent survey at Kansas University 
corroborated that sentiment: ninety percent of faculty indicated that allowing 
concealed carry by students would make them feel less safe,162 eighty percent said 
 
 159.  For this same reason, explaining Second Amendment doctrine by reference to motive analysis, 
like the one Kagan argued guides First Amendment speech doctrine, see Kagan, supra note 9, is almost 
impossible. Without knowing the precise values underlying the Second Amendment, we cannot derive 
an illegitimate governmental motive that doctrine should “smoke out.” 
 160.  See, e.g., Diana Reese, Moms Demonstrate for Gun Control, Armed Men Stage Counter-Protest 
in Indiana, WASH. POST: SHE THE PEOPLE (Mar. 29, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/she-
the-people/wp/2013/03/29/moms-demonstrate-for-gun-control-armed-men-stage-counter-protest-in-indi 
ana/ [https://perma.cc/P826-3P52] (armed demonstrators at 2013 rally in Indianapolis organized by Moms 
Demand Action for Gun Sense in America); Marc Tran, Men with Guns Swell Protest Crowds Outside 
Obama Meetings, GUARDIAN (Aug. 17, 2009, 9:04 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/ 
2009/aug/18/gun-protests-obama [https://perma.cc/ZSL3-C3MV] (armed protestors in Phoenix on 
August 16, 2009, where President Obama was speaking about healthcare reform); Igor Volsky, Men With 
Loaded Rifles Intimidate Moms Gathered at Gun Safety Rally, THINKPROGRESS (Mar. 28, 2013), 
https://thinkprogress.org/men-with-loaded-rifles-intimidate-moms-gathered-at-gun-safety-rally-82fbcbd 
00a73#.hknneiitw [https://perma.cc/B6YF-FPRD] (organizer of gun safety rally “unsettled” by presence 
of armed counter-protesters and “would have to think twice before holding another event”).  
 161.  Am. Ass’n of Univ. Professors et al., Joint Statement Opposing “Campus Carry” Laws (Nov. 12, 
2015), http://www.aaup.org/sites/default/files/CampusCarry.pdf [https://perma.cc/HS56-QRLA]. 
 162.  See GARY BRINKER, DOCKING INST. OF PUB. AFFAIRS, KANSAS BOARD OF REGENTS 
COUNCIL OF FACULTY SENATE PRESIDENTS CAMPUS EMPLOYEES’ WEAPONS SURVEY 37 (2016) 
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it would “negatively impact [their] course and how [they] teach,” and seventy-
seven percent believed it would “limit[] . . . academic freedom to teach the 
material and engage with the students in a way that optimizes learning.”163 
Similarly, legal scholars have concluded that firearms can diminish speech 
protected by the First Amendment. Professor Miller observed that 
the presence of a gun in public has the effect of chilling or distorting the essential 
channels of a democracy—public deliberation and interchange. . . . Even if everyone is 
equally armed, everyone is deterred from free-flowing democratic deliberation if each 
person risks violence from a particularly sensitive fellow citizen who might take 
offense.164  
Professor Gregory Magarian likewise opines that firearms can “undermine 
debate by fostering a climate of mistrust and fear.”165 
Thus weapons, because of their potential to diminish others’ perceived safety, 
may inhibit the “marketplace of ideas” protected by the First Amendment. The 
right to keep and bear arms, as Justice Stevens wrote in his McDonald dissent, is 
“dissimilar from [other liberty interests] in its capacity to undermine the security 
of others.”166 Words can be threat-neutral, but firearms cannot.167 This distinction 
explains why Heller and McDonald blessed broad restrictions on firearms that 
would never apply to speech, like the complete withdrawal of Second 
 
(“Kansas Employees’ Survey”). 
 163.  Id. at 32. The general sentiment among faculty regarding concealed carry was also reflected in a 
letter from 40 professors to the Kansas Legislature. They wrote that allowing concealed carry “will make 
us and our students feel less safe,” “will compromise the open door policy many of us maintain,” and 
“will make students less open to working together with others whom they may not know well.” See 
University Distinguished Professors Issue Statement on Weapons Policy, K-STATE TODAY (Dec. 2, 2015), 
http://www.k-state.edu/today/announcement.php?id=23727 [https://perma.cc/LU6Z-X7TH]. 
 164.  Miller, supra note 49, at 1309–10 (2009) (citing Adam Winkler, Scrutinizing the Second 
Amendment, 105 MICH. L. REV. 683, 704 (2007)) (“Whereas robust protection of free speech . . . serves 
democracy, if everyone had access to howitzers and machine guns, representative democracy would likely 
be harder, not easier, to achieve.”).  
 165.  Gregory P. Magarian, Speaking Truth to Firepower: How the First Amendment Destabilizes the 
Second, 91 TEX. L. REV. 49, 95 (2012). See also FIRMIN DEBRABANDER, DO GUNS MAKE US FREE? 
DEMOCRACY AND THE ARMED SOCIETY 98 (2015) (“A gun fundamentally severs its bearer from the 
community of his peers; it causes others to treat him with trepidation and fear—if they approach him at 
all.”); Tran, supra note 160 (quoting political scientist Fred Solop of Northern Arizona University as 
noting that the presence of guns at political rallies is “quite scary for many people” and “creates a chilling 
effect in the ability . . . to carry on honest communication”). 
 166.  McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 894 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also Bonidy 
v. U.S. Postal Serv., 790 F.3d 1121, 1126 (10th Cir. 2015) (“The risk inherent in firearms . . . distinguishes 
the Second Amendment right from other fundamental rights that have been held to be evaluated under 
a strict scrutiny test, such as the right to marry and the right to be free from viewpoint discrimination, 
which can be exercised without creating a direct risk to others.”). 
 167.  Research shows that the human brain reacts to firearms the same way that it reacts to snakes, 
and quite differently than the brain reacts to threat-neutral objects. Elaine Fox, Laura Griggs, & Elias 
Mouchlianitis, The Detection of Fear-Relevant Stimuli: Are Guns Noticed as Quickly as Snakes?, 7 
EMOTION 691 (2007). Meanwhile, so-called “weapon focus effect” is a “well-known cognitive bias” in 
which weapons “receive more fixations and longer fixations than do other hand-held objects.” Adam T. 
Biggs, James R. Brockmole, & Jessica K. Witt, Armed and Attentive: Holding a Weapon Can Bias 
Attentional Priorities in Scene Viewing, 75 ATTENTION PERCEPTION & PSYCHOPHYSICS 1715, 1716 
(2013).  
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Amendment rights from certain categories of potentially dangerous people.168 At 
minimum, the dynamic between “arms” and “speech”—ambivalent at best, 
antagonistic at worst—counsels against rote importation of doctrinal rules 
crafted to protect the “marketplace of ideas,” such as the First Amendment’s 
requirement of imminent harm before advocacy of violence can be 
constitutionally restricted. Further, the extremely salient risks presented by 
firearms enhance the strength of the government’s interest to preserve perceived 
safety through regulation. 
Yet, even if the government is permitted to regulate firearms to preserve the 
perception of safety, the government would still need to show that such a 
regulation passes heightened scrutiny. The remainder of the article considers 
some practical difficulties that could arise in that analysis. 
D. Pragmatic Considerations And The Perceived Safety Rationale 
Longstanding weapon regulations aimed at preserving the perception of 
safety can fall outside the boundaries of Second Amendment coverage 
altogether.169 If not longstanding, however, the regulation must pass muster 
under heightened scrutiny, where pragmatic difficulties could arise. This subpart 
discusses a few such difficulties: proving the connection between a regulation and 
perceived safety; distinguishing trivial from meaningful effects on perceived 
safety; dealing with baseless perceptions; and accounting for non-uniform 
perceptions.  
1. Proving the Connection Between a Regulation and Perceived Safety 
The two dissenting opinions in Friedman highlighted the problem of proving 
the connection between a regulation and the public’s sense of safety.170 
Conjecture about whether a policy achieves its regulatory objective may suffice 
for rational basis review, but more should be required when a constitutional right 
is implicated. A related difficulty is distinguishing between trivial and meaningful 
impacts on perceived safety. Even if a survey showed that 100 percent of 
Highland Park, Illinois residents would feel safer if assault weapons were banned, 
how much safer would they feel? And how much is sufficient to restrict the 
Second Amendment right? 
Courts often do not answer such questions with the rigor we desire, 
“frequently adopting an astonishingly casual approach” to evaluating 
government interests.171 Sometimes, for example, they simply assume a law 
advances the government’s purported interest.172 But this judicial practice does 
 
 168.  McDonald, 561 U.S. at 786; District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626–27 (2008). 
 169.  See sources cited supra note 106. 
 170.  See supra notes 128–130 and accompanying text. 
 171.  Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Strict Judicial Scrutiny, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1267, 1321 (2007); see also id. 
at 1322 (“Sometimes, . . . the Supreme Court labels interests as compelling on the basis of little or no 
textual inquiry.”). 
 172.  For example, in Crawford v. Marion County Election Board, the Supreme Court did not address 
the extent of the effect of a voter identification law on safeguarding voter confidence, 553 U.S. 181 (2008), 
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not make it doctrinally appropriate. Litigants and courts have various tools to 
support the connection between a given regulation and the asserted state interest, 
including historical precedent, provable effects of the regulation, other empirics, 
or (at minimum) reasoned analysis.173 
The Supreme Court has accepted, for example, history and tradition as a 
substitute for an empirical showing of difficult-to-measure government 
interests.174 This approach may be particularly appealing in Second Amendment 
doctrine, which already emphasizes the importance of history and tradition. For 
example, the law has historically restricted public carry where it undermines the 
perception of safety,175 and that legal history could inform the analysis of modern 
restrictions that are not deemed presumptively lawful, but aimed at that same 
objective. 
Another approach would be to look for objectively discernible byproducts 
relating to perceived safety. In the challenge to country-of-origin labeling on food 
products, for example, the court considered economic impacts of decreased 
public safety perceptions.176 Similarly, in the “secondary effects” cases, courts 
look to tangible adverse effects related to regulated speech, such as decreased 
property values.177 This tactic appears in other areas of law, too, like tort law, 
which generally requires some outward showing before recovering for a 
subjective harm in order to “distinguish between reliable and serious claims on 
the one hand, and unreliable and relatively trivial claims on the other.”178 
Litigants in Second Amendment cases could make a similar showing. The 
survey of Kansas University faculty, for example, gauged the intensity of the 
decrease in perceived safety if campus carry were allowed by asking faculty if 
they would change the way they taught.179 In Texas, meanwhile, at least one 
professor has quit because of campus carry, noting that allowing concealed carry 
on campus “does scare people away; it scares me away.”180 A longtime dean 
followed suit, citing campus carry as his reason for accepting employment 
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elsewhere.181 Others initiated a lawsuit against the school.182 Such empirical 
evidence and anecdotes may not perfectly mirror the extent of a change in 
perceived safety, but they provide a much closer approximation than mere 
speculation. 
2. Baseless Perceptions 
Another objection, separate from measuring the change in perceived safety, 
is that a shift in perceived safety may be baseless. Indeed, a major critique of 
public risk perceptions generally is that they may be constrained by mental 
shortcuts and cultural influences, sometimes conflicting with expert 
assessments.183 
One might respond that the perception of safety is itself worth preserving, 
even if baseless. All things being equal, people prefer living in a community they 
perceive to be safe. And perceived insecurity can lead to societal harms, such as 
chilling political discourse.184 
Yet, accommodating baseless safety perceptions would be a steep price to pay 
for regulating an enumerated right, not to mention setting potentially dangerous 
precedent.185 Thus, courts understandably will be careful with this rationale. In 
practice, they may be more comfortable relying on perceived safety when there 
also is empirical evidence of safety benefits of a regulation, even if the evidence 
is contested. Friedman reflects that context—the Seventh Circuit turned to 
perceived safety only after discussing contested evidence of the safety benefits of 
an assault weapon ban.186 Under those circumstances, community perceptions of 
safety could, in effect, break the tie about the actual safety benefits of the law. Of 
course, limiting the role of perceived safety in this way would exclude some 
situations where no empirical studies exist, a community perceives itself to be 
safer with a given restriction, and the feeling is not baseless. But such a tradeoff 
is nothing new in constitutional doctrine.187 
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3. Non-Uniform Perceptions 
Another doctrinal consideration is that even if a court accepted that a 
community reasonably feels safer with a given firearm regulation, that sentiment 
may not be uniform across communities. Returning to the public carry example, 
the University of Kansas survey shows that some communities will 
overwhelmingly correlate restricting public carry with enhanced safety. A similar 
correlation might be expected in metropolitan areas unaccustomed to gun culture 
where “peoples’ insecurity would rise to unbearable levels if they perceived that 
a good percentage of the people walking next to them on the street, sitting next 
to them on a subway train, or waiting on line with them at a parking garage were 
armed with a concealed handgun.”188 Other firearm-related conduct, or the 
marketing of certain types of firearms (like assault weapons), may have similar 
impacts on perceived safety in some places. 
One would expect rural areas and communities more accustomed to guns, 
however, to view regulation differently than a university or New York City. In 
fact, nationwide polls show a closer divide between those who perceive safety 
decreases or increases when more people carry firearms than the response 
yielded by the Kansas University survey.189 Similarly, some states have loosened 
concealed carry restrictions while others have tightened them, all in the name of 
public safety, further evidence that communities perceive the connection 
between restrictions and public safety differently. 
Reliance on perceived safety to justify weapons regulation, then, could inject 
geographic variability into the constitutional analysis. To what extent can, or 
should, Second Amendment doctrine accommodate such local and regional 
variation? Should Second Amendment doctrine be like obscenity doctrine, which 
allows for regional variation in the form of “contemporary community 
standards?”190 “It is neither realistic nor constitutionally sound,” the Court 
explained in Miller v. California, “to read the First Amendment as requiring that 
the people of Maine or Mississippi accept public depiction of conduct found 
tolerable in Las Vegas, or New York City.”191 
On one hand, such regional variation is generally disfavored in constitutional 
analysis. Rights are presumed to apply uniformly. On the other hand, some 
Supreme Court language, as well as the history of local and regional gun 
 
 188.  JAMES B. JACOBS, CAN GUN CONTROL WORK? 224 (2002). 
 189.  Shortly after the Roseburg, Oregon mass shooting on October 1, 2015, a slight majority of 
respondents in a nationwide Gallup poll said that the country would be safer if more people carried 
concealed weapons. See Frank Newport, Majority Say More Concealed Weapons Would Make U.S. Safer, 
GALLUP (Oct. 20, 2015), http://www.gallup.com/poll/186263/majority-say-concealed-weapons-safer.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/HJC7-4745]. Less than a year later, a nationwide Quinnipiac University poll reached 
the opposite conclusion when respondents were asked a similar question: 52 percent said they would feel 
less safe and 40 percent said they would feel safer if more people carried guns.  See Quinnipiac University, 
Overwhelming Support for No-Fly, No-Buy Gun Law, Quinnipiac University National Poll Finds; 
Support for Background Checks Tops 90 Percent Again (Jun. 30, 2016), https://poll.qu.edu/ 
national/release-detail?ReleaseID=2364 [https://perma.cc/Z44F-GMCV]. 
 190.  Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973). 
 191.  Id. at 32. 
RUBEN_PROOF (DO NOT DELETE) 4/28/2017  12:14 PM 
No. 2 2017] JUSTIFYING PERCEPTIONS 177 
regulation, suggest that Second Amendment doctrine, like obscenity doctrine, 
might be an exception to the general rule. In particular, Justice Samuel Alito’s 
opinion in McDonald observed that “conditions and problems differ from locality 
to locality and . . . citizens in different jurisdictions have divergent views on the 
issue of gun control.”192 The Second Amendment, Alito continued, does not 
eliminate the “ability to devise solutions to social problems that suit local needs 
and values.”193 Moreover, given the importance of tradition in Second 
Amendment analysis, permitting localized and regionalized tailoring would 
accord with a long history of varying firearm regulations based on differing local 
or regional security concerns.194 
  V  
CONCLUSION 
Perceptions often animate regulations and sometimes are relied upon to 
defend them against constitutional challenge. The First and Second Amendments 
present good case studies of this phenomenon in rights-impinging contexts. First 
Amendment doctrine generally rejects the use of some perceptions, like 
preventing offensiveness, as legitimate rationales for regulating speech. But other 
perceptions, like the perception of the integrity of the judiciary, are fully 
embraced. In the end, whether a perception will be rejected or accepted is best 
explained by looking to the distinct principles underlying the First Amendment 
right. 
Preserving the perception of safety would almost certainly be rejected as a 
justification for a speech restriction, but that does not mean it must be off the 
table as a justification for a gun restriction. The applicability of First Amendment 
rules in the Second Amendment context is not automatic given the vastly 
different history, principles, and costs associated with the Second Amendment 
right. Such differences should inform any effort to transplant doctrine from one 
constitutional area to another. Indeed, perceived safety has a more legitimate 
role justifying firearm regulations than speech regulations. In the end, whether 
perceived safety plays a meaningful role in justifying future firearm regulations 
will likely turn on whether litigants and courts can address the practical 
challenges such a regulatory rationale presents. 
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